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Summary of the Arguments
In his Opening Brief, Matthew Holste argued that he was not required to
register as a sex offender under the plain language of the Registry Statute, Utah
Code§ 77-41-105, because he was not "convicted" by any other jurisdiction-as
Utah's common-law definition of conviction does not extend to a withheld
judgment in Idaho. (Op. Br. 12). And even though Mr. Holste is required to
register in Idaho, the plain language of the Utah Registry Statute only requires
the registry of those who have to register in another jurisdiction if they are also
convicted by another jurisdiction. (Op. Br. 15.) In support of his plain language

argument, Mr. Holste employed analyses under three canons of statutory
interpretation: the surplusage canon, the negative implication canon, and the
omitted-case canon. (Op. Br. 19-24.)
The State responded that Mr. Holste's first argument failed because he
was, in fact, convicted by another jurisdiction. (St. Br. 10.) In support of its
argument, the State contended that this Court must look to Idaho law to
determine whether Mr. Holste was convicted and that Mr. Holste was "convicted"
under Idaho law, so Mr. Holste's withheld judgment should be considered a
conviction under Utah law as well. (St. Br. 13, 18.)
The State also responded that Mr. Holste must register even ifhe is not
convicted because reading the statutory provisions in harmony with one another
compel that result. (St. Br. 33.) In so arguing, the State discounted the canons
Mr. Holste relied upon as inapplicable.
1
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And finally, the State asked this Court to interpret the statute in the State's
favor should it be found to be ambiguous.
This Court should not find the State's arguments persuasive for several
reasons.
First, according to Idaho law itself, Idaho's registration statute is clearly a

limited purpose exception to the global rule that a withdrawn judgment and setaside plea is not a conviction in Idaho-and that provision applies only for the
limited purpose of requiring Mr. Holste to register in Idaho. The specific
provision that requires Mr. Holste to register in Idaho does not otherwise
undermine the contention that, for all other purposes, Mr. Holste's plea been set
aside and does not count as a "conviction under Idaho law." Nor does it
necessarily follow that Utah's Registry Statute to requires him to register; Utah's
registration statute lacks the specificity of Idaho's with respect to "withheld
convictions" or "pleas in abeyance."
Second, nothing in the State's construction of Utah's Registry Statute
successfully challenges Mr. Holste's interpretation of its plain language. Utah's
Registry Statute, by its plain language, distinguishes between people who have
been convicted by another jurisdiction and people who must register under the
laws of that jurisdiction. It does not require registration unless both prongs are
met. Mr. Holste only meets one prong of that test and is, thus, omitted from
Utah's registration requirement. And plain language trumps legislative intent.

2
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Finally, failure to register when it is required is a felony-which means it is
a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. Accordingly, if this Court
finds Utah's Registry Statute to be ambiguous, it should apply the rule of lenity to
construe the ambiguities in favor of Mr. Holste, not the State.

Argument
1.

The Idaho Statute Requiring Mr. Holste to Register in Idaho
Does Not Require Mr. Holste to Register in Utah
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Holste argued that he was not "convicted" within

the meaning of Utah Code § 77-41-105(1), the Registration Provision, because his
guilty plea had been set aside. As set forth in his Opening Brief, Mr. Holste
pleaded guilty under an Idaho statute that provided that his plea would be set
aside after completion of the required probation. Mr. Holste completed probation
and his plea was set aside in 2010. No final judgment was ever entered.
Mr. Holste cited Idaho authority for the proposition that his guilty plea had
been set aside under Idaho Code § 19-2604. Under Idaho law, "Where a
judgment has been vacated under this statute, it is a nullity, and the effect is as if
it had never been rendered at all, and there are no limits or conditions on the
rights defendant regains." State v. Parkinson, 172 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Idaho 2007),

abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med Center, 265 P.
3d 502 (Idaho 2011).
The State claims that Mr. Holste's reliance on the "nullity" of his set aside
plea is "simply inaccurate." (St. Br. 15.) The State supports its contention by
3
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pointing out that under Idaho law, Mr. Holste's set-aside plea nonetheless counts
as a "conviction" for the purposes of the Idaho sex offender registry statutemeaning that Mr. Holste is still required to register in Idaho under Idaho Code§
18-8304(3). In the State's words, "a guilty plea to a sex offense remains a
conviction [in Idaho] for sex offender registration purposes [in Idaho] even if it is
set aside as part of a withheld judgment." (St. Br. 13.) In truth, aside from using
the word "conviction," this is a non-statement. Mr. Holste has already conceded
that he was required to register in Idaho under that statute. So the State's
declaration that the Idaho statute requires him to register in Utah does not
answer any part of Mr. Holste's original argument.
The big picture is this: in Idaho, a set-aside guilty plea is, in fact, a nullity,
except where a limited-purpose statutory exception exists. See State v. Robinson,
142 P.3d 729,731 (Idaho 2006). One statutory exception is found in Idaho's sex
offender registry statute, Idaho Code § 18-8304(3), which requires sex offenders
to register in Idaho, even if their plea is set aside. But Idaho Code § 18-8304(3)
defines a "conviction" as a guilty plea, regardless of a subsequent withheld
judgment, "for purposes of this chapter." Idaho Code § 18-8304(3). That chapter
is Chapter 83 of Title 18 of Idaho's Code. The word "conviction" is, therefore,
used for a limited purpose of requiring people to register in Idaho. But this
provision does not undo the reality that for every other purpose-every purpose
excluding registration in Idaho-Mr. Holste is not convicted in Idaho.

4
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The cases cited by the State only confirm that the Idaho registration statute
is a limitation on the otherwise universal rule that a set-aside conviction becomes
a nullity. For example:

4i

The dismissal of a criminal charge under LC. § 192604(1) is an act of leniency by the court,
notwithstanding the defendant's actual guilt of the
charged offense. Where a judgment has been vacated
under this statute, it is a nullity, and the effect is as if it
had never been rendered at all. Moreover, there are no
limits or conditions on the rights which a defendant
regains. However, LC. § 19-2604(1) does not address the
specific ramifications of a final dismissal. A dismissal
under LC. § 19-2604(1) is not akin to setting aside a
conviction or dismissing a charge based on a procedural
error in the criminal proceedings, nor is it a
determination that the defendant is factually innocent.
Most importantly, because the power to withhold
judgment and ultimately dismiss the charges has been
conferred on the courts by statute, it may also be
abrogated or limited by statute.
Robinson, 142 P.3d at 731 (cleaned up).

The State also relies upon State v. Glenn, 319 P.3d 1191 (Idaho 2014). That
case again illustrates the same distinction-that another statute might override
Idaho Code § 19-2604 for a limited purpose: "This Court has accepted the
proposition that the effects of LC. § 19-2604(1) could be overridden by another
statute ...." Glenn, 319 P.3d at 1195 (quotation omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Thus, Mr. Holste's set-aside plea is a nullity-even in Idaho-but for the limited
purpose of a registration requirement in Idaho.
And the plain language of Idaho's sex offender registry statute limits its
application to the four corners of its chapter, in any event. As the Idaho sex
5
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offender statute reads, "A conviction for purposes of this chapter [the Idaho sex
offender registration chapter] means that the person has pled guilty or has been
found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment."
Idaho Code§ 18-8304(3). The language does not extend itself to any other
chapter of any other code in any other state where this code might be implicated.
Instead, its application is limited to the "purposes of this chapter"-Idaho's sex
offender registration chapter. It does not announce a conviction reinstatement; it
announces a registration requirement, and that is all it does.
The State may wish that Utah had adopted Idaho's registration statute
instead of the statute it did enact, but it didn't. Utah's registration statute is
different.
To begin with, Utah has no statutory provision defining "conviction" to
mirror that of Idaho's sex offender registration statute, Idaho Code§ 18-8304(3);
rather, Utah's definition of "conviction" has been established by its case law. And
Utah's Registry Statute contains no applicable provision comparable to the Idaho
pronouncement that "[a] conviction for purposes of this chapter means that the
person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the
judgment or withheld judgment." Idaho Code§ 18-8304(3) (emphasis supplied).
This Court has defined "conviction" to mean one of two things: "guilt by
verdict or plea" or "final judgment entered on the plea or verdict." State v. Hunt,
906 P.2d 311,313 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted). Neither of these definitions

applies to Mr. Holste's status: his guilty plea has been set aside, and under Idaho
6
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law, is a nullity for general purposes. Nor has there been any final judgment
entered on the plea or the verdict. Nothing the State has pointed to says
otherwise.
The State, nevertheless, argues that the law in Utah is similar to the law in
Idaho regarding pleas in abeyance, and therefore the provisions of Idaho's sex
offender registration statute, Idaho Code§ 18-8304(3), should be imported into
Utah law. (St. Br. 13-18.)
But the Utah Registry Statute must be interpreted in relationship to Utah
law, including the decision whether a person has been "convicted" within the
meaning of the statute. In fact, this Court has expressly held that there is a
presumption against the extra-territorial application of the criminal law of
another state:
[C]riminality is the domain of the separate states, and
that activity wholly in one state cannot properly be
subject
to
criminal
charges
m
another.
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a sufficient
basis for our decision limiting section 111 to conduct
satisfying the jurisdictional prerequisites to a formal
charge or conviction of a criminal offense. At the very
least, we can conclude that section 111 gives no "clear
indication of an extraterritorial application." At a
minimum, it can be said that the statute is silent on the
question whether sexual conduct between non-Utahns
outside of Utah could "constitute a[] sexual offense"
under Utah law. And the lack of statutory clarity on that
matter is sufficient to foreclose its application to conduct
bearing no jurisdictional connection to Utah.

7
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Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015 UT 34, ,r,r 36-37, 345 P.3d 719 (citation omitted).

1

The State also cites Utah Code§ 77-41-105(3)(c)(ii)-stating that a
registration requirement for certain Utah offenses may not be "terminated or
altered" during the offender's lifetime-somehow requires this Court to extend
that logic to Idaho law. (St. Br. 20-21.) But that is not what Utah Code§ 77-41105(3)(c)(ii) says; therefore, that is not what the statute allows. Such an
application would violate notice principles of due process. Utah Code § 77-41105(3)(c)(ii)'s own limiting language applies its provision only to Utah offenses,
for better or worse.
The State also asks this Court to borrow language from other very specific
statutory provisions providing that in certain Utah offenses, pleas in abeyance do
not set aside pleas for purposes of the Utah Registry Statute. (St. Br. 20-21.) But
this too violates notice principles of due process. Again, those statutes' own
limiting language applies their provisions for limited purposes-only to those
enumerated Utah offenses.
Within the Utah meaning of the word "convicted," Mr. Holste's set-aside
plea is not a conviction. And within the Idaho meaning of the word "convicted,"

And surely when the Legislature used the term "convicted by another
jurisdiction" in subsection (1)(a) of the Registry Provision, the Legislature did not
intend Utah law enforcement agencies to go hunting around in other states'
statutes to determine whether a person was "convicted" under the law of that
state. That would be an onerous burden. And although the Legislature may
certainly impose that burden in some instances, it did not clearly and explicitly
do so here.
1

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Mr. Holste's set-aside plea is also not a "conviction." It can only be said to be a
"conviction" for the limited purposes of Idaho's registration requirement
statute-nothing more.
What's more, the Idaho registration act does not govern Utah's registration
requirements. The Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho statute both make it clear
that Idaho's registration statute is a limited purpose exception to the rule that a
set aside plea is not a conviction and that it applies only for the limited purpose of
requiring Mr. Holste to register in Idaho.
In short, Idaho has chosen to define its registration requirement by
defining the word "conviction" for limited purposes. See Idaho Code§ 188304(3). On the other hand, Utah has defined "conviction" under common law in

a way that excludes someone in Mr. Holste's position from having to register;
because his guilty plea was withdrawn and there is no final judgment, he is not
"convicted" under Utah law. Mr. Holste is not subject to the registration
requirements of Utah's Registry Statute, as he has not been "convicted" of a sexbased offense within the meaning of Utah or Idaho law. To be clear, Mr. Holste is
not convicted in Idaho; he is merely required to register in Idaho because Idaho's
registration statute treats him as convicted for the limited purpose of having to
register under Idaho law. See Idaho Code§ 18-8304(3). But that limited-purpose
conviction does not extend outside the four corners of that Idaho statute-in
either Idaho or Utah.

9
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Thus, for all intents and purposes, it is still true that in Idaho, setting aside
a plea restores a defendants' rights "and there are no limits or conditions on the
rights defendant regains," except as allowed by Idaho statute for limited
purposes. See Parkinson, 172 P.3d at 1103.
Mr. Holste is required to register in Idaho; all other rights have been
restored except as provided in Idaho by Idaho law. His requirement to register in
Idaho does not otherwise affect the rule that a set-aside conviction is a nullity for
all other purposes. And it certainly does not allow Utah's Registry Statute to
require Mr. Holste to register without that requirement being clearly mandated
by the specific language of the Utah registration requirements.

10
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2.

The State's Construction of the Registry Statute Fails to
Aclmowledge Intentional Limitations Included in the Statute's
Plain Language
The State argues that Mr. Holste's interpretation of the Registry Statute is

"implausible." (St. Br. 33.) It states that the cited "canons of interpretation do not
compel a different result. But reading section 105 with the entire chapter does."
(St. Br. 23.) The State's argument is akin to saying, while no plain language in the
chapter compels the reading it would like, the "spirit" of the chapter does. Thus,
nothing in the State's construction successfully challenges Mr. Holste's
interpretation.
Mr. Holste suggested several statutory canons to apply to this statute-and
the State suggested one of its own-but none applies more directly or more
persuasively than the plain language canon.
Under the plain language canon, courts "read the plain language of the
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in
the same chapter and related chapters." Salt Lake City v. Valdez-Sadler, 2015 UT
App 203, ,I 13,358 P.3d 341 (quotation omitted). Additionally, courts "interpret
statutes to give meaning to all parts and avoid rendering portions of the statute
superfluous. Finally, when two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more
specific provision will govern over the more general provision." Id. (cleaned up).
Under the Utah Registry Provision, Utah Code§ 77-41-105, the more
specific language "offender who has been convicted" should govern over the more
general "offender" language in adjacent provisions-specifically in the provision
1
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cited by the court of appeals, Utah Code§ 77-41-105(3)(a); 2 otherwise, the
modifier "who has been convicted" -as well as every other modifier used
throughout the statute, and there are many-would be superfluous. 3 Nothing in
the State's brief adequately addresses this issue.
Idaho elected to specifically make its registry statute applicable to people
whose "convictions" were set aside for the limited purposes of registration as sex
offenders in Idaho. See Idaho Code § 18-8304(3). Utah could have done the same
but did not. To the contrary, Utah's registration provision, by its plain language,
distinguishes between people who have been convicted by another jurisdictiqn
and must register under the laws of that jurisdiction.

4

The State asserts that Subsection (3)(a) must be a registration provision
because Subsection (6) refers to Subsection (3)(a) as a registration provision. See
Utah Code§ 77-41-105(3)(a), (6). But the State's reading is incorrect. Subsection
(6) reads: "An offender who is required to register under Subsection (3) shall
surrender the offender's license, certificate, or identification card ...." Utah Code
§ 77-41-105(6) (emphases added). The language "who is required to register
under Subsection (3)" is a postmodifier and suggests that there are offenders who
are also not required to register under Subsection (3). Again, if the Legislature
meant for all offenders to register, it could have just said so. But it didn't.
2

3 And, more to the point, the State's interpretation leaves one very critical
question unanswered: if the statute does not distinguish between offenders who
are "convicted" and offenders who are "required to register," then why does it
distinguish between offenders who are "convicted" and offenders who are
"required to register"? If the purpose of the statute was for all "offenders" to
register, surely it would have been simpler and more straightforward to say "all of
these people qualify as offenders for purposes of this statute" and "all offenders
are required to register"-without any modifier.

Notably, Utah is not alone in not requiring the registration of certain
individuals who have committed sex offenses. For example, Connecticut's
Sentencing Commission recently concluded a two-year study on its sex offender
4
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The State's argument is, quite simply, circular. Idaho has a statute
requiring Mr. Holste to register as a sex offender, even though his plea has been
set aside. Idaho law is quite clear that but for the existence of that specific Idaho
statute, Idaho Code § 18-8304(3), the "conviction" would be considered a nullity
and not enforceable.
Utah's Registry Statute has no comparable provision, however. Not only
does Utah's Registry Statute fail to equate "conviction" with "requirement to
register," it expressly separates out offenders who have been "convicted" from
those who have to register for the purposes of the statute.
The relevant canons of construction demonstrate that the Utah Legislature
itself created a distinction under Utah law that does not exist under Idaho law.

~

registry, and it concluded that the state needed to modify its registry to make
registration based on risk level rather than on the mere fact that someone was
convicted in the past. A STUDY OF THE SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, REGISTRATION,
AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, CONNECTICUT SENTENCING COMMISSION (2017),
available athttps://www.ct.gov/ ctsc/lib/ ctsc/Sex_Offender_Report_11.03.2017
Final_edits.pdf. And Wyoming's sex offender registration statute defines
"conviction" as a guilty plea, but it excludes from "conviction" dispositions
similar to the plea-in-abeyance procedure in Utah-those who plead guilty but
successfully complete a probationary term. See Wyoming Stat. § 7-19-301(a)(iii),
7-13-301.
These states are part of a growing movement recognizing that the sex
offender registries are bloated-861,ooo people were on the registry as of 2017and place onerous burdens on the vast majority of the registrants, who are "nonviolent and non-reoffending." Catherine L. Carpenter, A Sign of Hope: Shifting
Attitudes on Sex Offense Registration Laws, 47 SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW 1,
4-6 (2017). One study found that only 5.3 percent of sex offenders were arrested
for another sex crime three years following their release from prison. s PERCENT
OF SEX OFFENDERS REARRESTED FOR ANOTHER SEX CRIME WITHIN 3 YEARS OF
PRISON RELEASE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Nov. 16, 2003), available at
https://www.bjs.gov/ content/pub/press/rsorp94pr.cfm.
3
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Whether it intended to do so or not is irrelevant; the plain language must govern,
and the specific terms must rule the general provisions.
Proper application of the statutory construction canons demonstrates an
undeniable distinction between a person with a valid outstanding conviction and
a person who merely has to register under the laws of another jurisdiction and
clearly provides that the former must register, but that the latter need not.
Moreover, the State's argument leaves one enormous question unanswered: The
definition of" offender" draws a distinction between someone who has been
convicted and someone who has to register. The statute then uses that distinction
to say that "convicted" offenders must register. Why does the statute draw this
distinction, if not to make the distinction?
If, however, the Court finds that the State's interpretation is as plausible as

Mr. Holste's, then as the State acknowledges, the statute is ambiguous. As set
forth in the following section-and contrary to the State's contention-an
ambiguous statute that carries a criminal penalty must be construed against the
State and in favor of the individual facing the criminal consequences.

4
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If the Statute Is Ambiguous, It Must Be Interpreted in Favor of
Mr. Holste-Not in Favor of the State
The State's final argument is that, if the Registry Statute is ambiguous, the
statute's legislative history demonstrates that the ambiguities should be resolved
in favor of the State. Mr. Holste disagrees.
First of all, an inquiry into "legislative intent" has little value and is a poor
substitute for a plain language statutory analysis. Scalia and Garner call such an
inquiry a "false notion" for the very simple reason that "legislative intent" is a
fiction:
[In] the context of legislation, ... collective intent is pure
fiction because dozens if not hundreds oflegislators have
their own subjective views on the minutiae of the bills
they are voting on-or perhaps no views at all because
they are wholly unaware of the minutiae.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL

TEXTS 392 (2012). s

Moreover, when an ambiguous statute imposes criminal liability, the rule
oflenity applies. Failure to register, if registration is required, is a felony. Utah

s The State argues that the clear "intent" of the Legislature is to make sure
that every conceivable "sex offender" is registered. Mr. Holste posits that it is
equally possible that at least some of the legislators might have been concerned
that the sex offender registry would be over-inclusive and include people with
little or no likelihood of a repeat offence, reducing the effectiveness of the
registry. As someone who was granted a plea in abeyance in another state, has
complied with all the terms of his probation, has had the guilty plea expunged
and has not committed any offense in over ten years, Mr. Holste falls into exactly
the sort of category that a legislator might reasonably conclude should be exempt
from the registration requirement.
5
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Code § 77-41-107. 6 Accordingly, if the Court finds the statute to be ambiguous, it
should apply the rule of lenity to construe the ambiguities in favor of Mr. Holste.
The rule oflenity resolves statutory ambiguity in favor of the defendant. And
there is good reason for it:
On the whole, it might fairly be said that the rule oflenity
is underused in modern judicial decision-makingperhaps the consequence of zeal to smite the wicked. The
defendant has almost always done a bad thing, and the
instinct to punish the wrongdoer is a strong one. But a
fair system of laws requires precision in the definition of
offenses and punishments. The less courts insist on
precision, the less the legislatures will take the trouble to
provide it.
READING LAW at 301.

This concept has direct application to the statute at issue in this appeal.
Mr. Holste contends that the statute is unambiguous, in that it clearly
distinguishes between someone who has a valid outstanding conviction in
another state and someone who is merely required to register under the laws of
another state. And Utah law requires only those who are "convicted" in another
state to register in Utah. The State has argued another interpretation, based not
on the plain language of the statute, but instead requiring extensive reference to

6

Courts around the country have applied the rule of lenity to sex offender
registry statutes, because the failure to register is a criminal act. See United
States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 925-27 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cain,
583 F.3d 408,417 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 859
n.7 (nth Cir. 2008); State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 135-36 (Iowa 2018);
Kersting v. Replogle, 492 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Doe v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 925 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Mass. 2010).
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external sources, including legislative history and the laws of another
jurisdiction. The rule of lenity says that a person subject to criminal liability
should be able to tell from the words of the statute itself what he is required to
do; if the statute is subject to more than one interpretation, then it does not have
the requisite precision to impose criminal liability. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT
72, ,r 24, 356 P.3d 1258.

This Court has recognized the application of the rule of lenity in cases
where a criminal statute is ambiguous and has further acknowledged that the
issue is one of fundamental due process:

~

The United States Supreme Court has held that the rule
of lenity "is rooted in fundamental principles of due
process which mandate that no individual be forced to
speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is
prohibited." The reasoning behind the Court's holding is
simple. An ambiguous statute violates the notice
requirement of due process because it "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." The
Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution provides an
alternative basis for the same protection. That provision
"do[es] not permit enforcement of a statute that forbids
an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute's]
meaning and differ as to its application." Thus, the rule
of lenity is dictated by the notice protection afforded by
both federal and state due process.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Accordingly, the State's contention that an ambiguous statute with
criminal penalties should be interpreted in favor of imposing criminal liability is
contrary to rules of due process and fundamental fairness. The legislature's lack
7
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of precision in drafting the statute should be laid at the feet of the State, and not
on the shoulders of Mr. Holste. If the Court finds that both the State and Mr.
Holste have posited reasonable interpretations of the Registry Statute, it is then
by definition "ambiguous," and the rule of lenity should apply to tip the scales in
favor of Mr. Holste's interpretation.

Conclusion
No provision of the Registry Statute explicitly requires the registration of
offenders who are offenders because they must register in another jurisdiction.
The interpretive canons reject reading such a provision into the Registry Statute.
Because the court of appeals and the district court erred in their
interpretations of the statute, Mr. Holste requests that this Court reverse both
courts and remand with instructions that the district court enter a judgment
declaring that the Registry Statute does not require Mr. Holste to register.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2018.

~

/s/ Sara Pfrommer
Sara Pfrommer (9336)
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1110 E. Eaglewood Dr.
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